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COMMENTS
IS THAT LEGAL?: THE UNITED STATES'
UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ANTI-
BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
Emily K. Penney'
What was recently referred to as "the most sensitive national security
issue of the day"1 - withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM Treaty) with the implementation of the National Missile Defense
Plan (NMD) - has now taken second stage to the Bush administration's
newly announced "War on Terrorism."' Early in his administration,
President George W. Bush clearly stated his commitment to the
development of a National Missile Defense Plan, even though it may
eventually require the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty.' Despite these new security concerns, the Bush
administration announced less than a week after the September 11th
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that it
planned to move forward with a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972
ABM Treaty in order to facilitate the formation of a missile defense
+ J.D. Candidate at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. Michael O'Hanlon, Double Talk on Missile Defense, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001,
at A23 (detailing the Bush administration's plan for missile defense and explaining various
revisions that should be made to the plan for it to be effective).
2. See Steven Mufson, Postponement Shows Shift in Priorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
2001, at A4. There has been a significant shift in the Bush administration's policy on the
ABM Treaty following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001. See id. One commentator noted that "[j]ust two months ago, a
gambling person would not have bet against the Bush administration's determination to
pursue missile defense tests, even if it meant discarding the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty." Id. To illustrate this development regarding the ABM Treaty issue, Stanford
University professor Michael McFaul, who is also an expert on Russia at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, noted that "[b]efore Sept. 11, this [missile defense]
was the number one foreign policy issue, the place where the Bush administration wanted
to leave a legacy. Before Sept. 11, that was what they thought they would be judged
upon." Id.
3. Sharon LaFraniere, Kremlin Raises Doubts About Texas Summit Plan, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 2001, at A23 (discussing the scheduled November 2001 meeting between
Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush and its possible implications for the
ABM Treaty question).
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system. Administration officials have continuously reinforced the
priority of missile defense, even stating that "if anything, the likelihood
of unilateral withdrawal has increased" due to the terrorist attacks
The ABM Treaty is a bilateral treaty signed by the U.S.S.R. and the
United States in 1972 and has been considered a "cornerstone" of arms
control for the last thirty years.6 The thrust of the Treaty is to facilitate
reductions in nuclear stockholds and capabilities while also limiting the
defense systems of both sides. Accordingly, the ABM Treaty prohibits
either side from deploying a National Missile Defense System [NMD] to
protect itself from a potential nuclear attack." The idea is that the fear
of nuclear destruction, without the possibility of a shield or defense
system, will ensure that neither nation instigates such warfare. 9
At present, President Bush and his staff insist that the ABM Treaty is
no longer an effective measure to protect the United States from nuclear
attack because the dynamics of the global nuclear stage have been
altered by the dissolution of the U.S.S.R."0 Instead, they assert that the
NMD's new technology is now necessary to prevent accidental launches
or attacks by small, hostile states referred to as "rogue states."" The
President has continuously asserted that "we must move beyond the
4. Susan B. Glasser, US. To Pursue Withdrawal from ABM Pact, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 2001, at A28.
5. Id.
6. David Edward Grogan, Power Play: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, National
Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 803-04 (1999)
(stating that the ABM and the companion Interim Agreement, collectively known as the
SALT I accords, were "viewed as promising steps to rational nuclear disarmament"); see
also David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms
Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1367 (1989) (stating that "the ABM Treaty has
come to be recognized as one of the most successful and important arms control
agreements"). The Russian government has consistently expressed a similar view on the
significance of the ABM. See Glasser, supra note 4, at A28. For example, President
Vladimir Putin, in asserting his unwillingness to abandon the ABM Treaty, implied that
withdrawal would "unravel [] 'the entire framework of international security."' Id.
7. Angela M. Bradley, Opposing Interpretations of an International Treaty. The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Controversy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 295, 295 (2001).
& See id. at 295-96 (describing the utility of restricting nuclear missile defense).
9. See id. ("Any defense system capable of defending either side's major cities was
considered to be a negative contribution to the arms race, because once one side had such
a defense capability the other side would work until it produced the technology necessary
to pierce the system.").
10. See Bush Calls for Nuclear Cuts, Missile Defense Development, at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/treaty-abm-010501.html (last visited March 12,
2002) (detailing remarks by President Bush to students and faculty at the National
Defense University regarding the need for a National Missile Defense system).
11. Vernon Loeb, Russians Resolute on ABM Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2001, at
A9.
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constraints of the 30 year old ABM Treaty [because] [n]o treaty that
prevents us from addressing today's threat, that prohibits us from
pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our
allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.
' 12
Conversely, opponents of the NMD fear that withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty would not only destabilize the success of three decades of
arms control, but it would also instigate another arms race.1 3 Not only is
there resistance to the NMD at home (mostly from Congressional
Democrats), but also abroad (by many of the United States' closest
allies). 4 The general sentiment among these groups is one of trepidation
about the effects that Bush's plan will have on global nuclear stability
and the future of arms control. 5 Moreover, since the terrorist attacks,
there has been additional public criticism of the missile defense plan.
16
Top Russian officials have gone to great lengths to indicate the irony in
12. See Nuclear Cuts, supra note 10.
13. See generally JAMES M. LINDSAY & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, DEFENDING
AMERICA: THE CASE FOR LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE 1 (Brookings
Institution Press 2001) (illustrating the ABM debate through analysis of missile defense,
national security, and international politics).
14. See id. at 1. For example, "[tihere was some sense in some European capitals that
the National Missile Defense focus had an isolationalist impulse to it." Jim Garamone,
DOD Seeks to Expand New Relationship with Russia, AM. FOREIGN PRESS SERVICE,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/no8312001_ 200108312.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2002). Also, the Chinese fear that even though the United States insists
that the missile shield is to protect against states like North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, the true
purpose is to neutralize the Chinese nuclear deterrent. See O'Hanlon, supra note 1. See
also U.S. Denies Missile Deadline, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/
08/24/bush.defence/index.htmi (last visited March 12,2002).
15. LINDSAY & O'HANLON, supra note 13, at 1-2. A statement given by Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden pointedly expresses the anti-
missile defense sentiment: "Are we willing to end four decades of arms control
agreements to go it alone, a kind of bully nation ... and the hell with our treaties, our
commitments in the world? I don't believe our national interests can be furthered, let
alone achieved in splendid indifference to the rest of the world's views of our policies."
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Defining Our
Interests in a Changing World, Address Before the National Press Club (Sept. 10, 2001),
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/press/010910_speech.htmil (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
To rationalize the fear of impending global nuclear instability, Senator Biden explained
how a missile defense system would invite China to attempt expansion of its nuclear
arsenal by resuming nuclear testing. See id. China's actions would instigate its rival, India,
to increase testing, which would then instigate India's rival, Pakistan, and would
eventually lead to concerns with Taiwan and Japan competing against China's expanding
power in Asia. Id.
16. See Glasser, supra note 4.
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Washington's multi-billion dollar investment for missile defense
capabilities given the lack of weaponry implemented by the terrorists.
7
Centuries of international customary law define the methods by which
a nation may withdraw from a treaty."' Incorporating this international
withdrawal structure into the domestic laws of the United States raises
questions within the American justice system regarding the legality of
unilateral withdrawal. 9  The Bush administration's insistence that
withdrawal is necessary for national security may be a valid policy
argument, but it may not be enough to constitute a legal withdrawal in
light of international custom, domestic law, and the provisions of the
Treaty itself. Although the six-months notice that Bush plans to give to
Russia technically satisfies the requirements for withdrawal, 0 the
question remains: will it be enough to satisfy the Russians, our allies, or
even our potential adversaries?2' Pursuing other options in cooperation
with Russia, such as modifying the Treaty, may constitute a more
effective policy decision in light of the international customary law and
political turmoil surrounding the issue.22
This Comment first details the history and development of the ABM
Treaty over the last thirty years as the need for alterations have arisen
17. Id. (noting that Russian officials point to the "relatively low-tech nature of the
attacks, insisting that it undermines Washington's stated reason for spending billions of
dollars on a system of missile defense aimed at heading off a nuclear attack by small,
hostile states such as North Korea").
1& See generally SINCLAIR, infra note 87.
19. See infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
20. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), May
26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R, art. XV, 23 U.S.T. 3435 reprinted in SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC
DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 228 (3d ed. 1997) (stating
that the withdrawing party "shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months
prior to withdrawal from the Treaty").
21. See John Rhinelander, The ABM Treaty: Critical Then and Now, vol. 5, no. 12
(May 24, 2001), available at http://www.clw.org/coalition/briefv5nl2.htm (last updated Jan.
1, 2002). For example, even though China is not a party to the ABM, the Treaty is an
important factor in the relations between the United States and China. Id. A missile
defense system in the United States would minimize China's nuclear deterrent, and thus
China may respond to the NMD by expanding its strategic nuclear force to one that could
overcome any U.S. NMD. Id.
22. See Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Unilateral Withdrawal From the ABM
Treaty Is a Bad Idea, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 30, 2001 (proposing that the United
States' removal from the ABM would be "a foreign policy disaster" because Russia's
response would be to abandon its commitment to arms reduction and control). But see
The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
Memorandum of Law from Hunton & Williams to The Heritage Foundation (June 15,
1998) available at http://www.nationalsecurity.org/legalbrief/legalbrief.htm (asserting that
the ABM Treaty "has not deterred nuclear proliferation, and it will not enhance or
promote U.S. security in the current environment").
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due to changes on the international stage. Next, this Comment explains
the framework for withdrawal from an international agreement as
established by a provision within the Treaty itself, international
customary law, and domestic laws. Additionally, this Comment identifies
and describes the Bush administration's argument for withdrawal and
then highlights the legal flaws in this argument. Finally, this Comment
suggests that even if the Bush administration can withdraw without legal
consequences, a better policy would be to retain the ABM Treaty and
increase the United States' international involvement by cooperating
with other nations to protect against nuclear threats.
I. POLITICS AND THE LAW SURROUNDING THE ABM TREATY
A. The History of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
1. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972
The United States and the former Soviet Union negotiated the Treaty
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems during the height of
the Cold War in the hope of reducing the threat of nuclear warfare.
23
Both nations wanted to decrease the number of strategic weapons held
by their opponents and limit the defense systems available to both sides. 4
To facilitate these goals, the nations agreed to a reduction in arms
production, a scheduled disposal of a number of ballistic missiles, and a
halt on any national missile defense plan."
The theory known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which
ensures a mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack, operates with the ABM
to secure arms control.26  Under this theory, both nations' ability to
shield against nuclear attack is severely restricted because neither
23. Grogan, supra note 6, at 803-04.
24. Bradley, supra note 7, at 295.
25. See generally, ABM Treaty, supra note 20; see also, Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems under the ABM Treaty:
The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1956, 1957 (1986) (detailing that the
Treaty bans the "testing, development, and deployment of all ABM systems other than
fixed land-based systems"). The Treaty provides: "Each Party undertakes not to develop,
test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based,
or mobile land-based." ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. V(1).
26. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 803-05. The Treaty states: "Each Party undertakes
not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide
a base for such a defense .... ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. 1(2).
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possesses a National Missile Defense system.27 In the event of a nuclear
attack, neither nation could defend itself; thus, a nuclear war would most
likely lead to virtual annihilation." Because the two nations are aware of
this imminent destruction in the event of a nuclear confrontation, it is
extremely unlikely that either would instigate nuclear warfareY2
Consequently, the crucial facet in the Treaty is that both countries are
able to retain one interceptor site that contains sufficient nuclear
capability to destroy their opponents in the event that either launched a
preemptive strike)0 Because both nations have this capability, there is a
significant disincentive to initiate nuclear warfare.3
The theory of MAD is not the only consequential aspect of the ABM
Treaty. The Treaty's effectiveness also centers on a timetable of arms
reduction." The same day that the ABM Treaty was signed, the nations
also signed a companion Interim Agreement in which they agreed to a
moratorium on the level of certain nuclear weapons in each country's
arsenal.33 These two agreements are collectively known as the SALT I
27. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 804.
28. See id.
29. See Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., International Law and the Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 49, 57-58 (2000). But see Brian T.
Kennedy, MAD vs. Missile Defense: How the ABM Treaty Undermines the Security of the
United States and Its Allies, 4 NEXUS 99, 99-103 (1999) (underscoring the illogic of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) as a premise for national security strategy).
30. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 295-96. The practical function of "MAD" was
accomplished through strategic bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) that had the most effective retaliatory strike capability because of their mobility
and invulnerability to a first strike. Grogan, supra note 6, at 804.
31. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 295-96.
32. See Koplow, supra note 6, at 1366 (stating that the treaty "established a mutual
and strikingly-low level of strategic defense, forestalling, for the most part, what might
otherwise have developed into an expensive and destabilizing race in ABM technology").
33. See Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Chronology at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/
abmt/chron.htm (last visited March 12, 2002) (detailing the chronological history of the
ABM Treaty from 1967 to 2001). Some of the more significant aspects of the ABM's
history are stated by the authors:
1972-May 26 CONCLUSION OF SALT I TREATIES
1974-July 3 ABM TREATY PROTOCOL
1983-March 23 U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)
1985-March 12 NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS OPEN
1985-October 6 U.S. "BROAD" INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY
1986-October 11-12 REYKJAVIK SUMMIT
1991-January 29 GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMTED STRIKES
1992-January 31 RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR JOINT GLOBAL DEFENSE
SYSTEM
1992-June 17 WASHINGTON SUMMIT DECLARATION
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accords and were considered a significant measure in the control of
nuclear arms-then and today. 3 Additionally, in July of 1974, "[t]he
United States and the Soviet Union sign[ed] a protocol reducing the
number of ABM deployment areas permitted to each side from two to
one, and the number of ABM launchers and interceptors from 200 to
100.""5 These modifications, and others, were designed to reduce the
stockpile of nuclear weapons possessed by the two superpowers.
6
Although attention often focuses on the ABM Treaty's restrictions




Since the Treaty's inception in 1972, the United States and Russia have
worked to restructure the ABM Treaty concurrently with the changes in
global politics. 38 It is commonly accepted that "from time to time treaties
become seriously inconvenient to one or more of the parties, prompting
them to explore different approaches to the problem."3 9 Throughout the
Treaty's history, various administrations have suffered through dilemmas
similar to those of the present Bush administration.4°  Past
administrations have effectively protected the United States' interests by
retaining the Treaty and adhering to its policies, while varying its
interpretation and continuing to modify its provisions.41
March 23, 1983 marked the initiation of a new "broad" interpretation
of the ABM Treaty. On that date, in his now famous "Star Wars"
speech, President Ronald Reagan announced to the nation the
34. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 804. (stating that the two agreements were "viewed
as promising steps to rational nuclear disarmament").
35. See Treaty Chronology, supra note 33.
36. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 803-4.
37. See Barry Kellman, National Missile Defense in the Context of Mulitlateral,
Multifaceted Security 4 NEXUS 73, 78 (1999). "By preventing a destabilizing competition
between offense and defense, the ABM Treaty enabled the superpowers to negotiate
offensive arms limits." Id.
38. See Burrus M. Carnahan & Katherine L. Starr, Law and Policy in the Amendment
of Arms Control Agreements, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 615, 616 n.4 (1998)
(explaining that the ABM Treaty "underwent a series of modifications and attempted
reinterpretations since 1972 while attempting to ensure the maintenance of a strategic
balance between the United States and Russia in light of technological advances").
39. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 331 (2001).
40. See discussion infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3.
41. See id.
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implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).42 SDI was a
major defense effort designed to destroy Soviet missiles in flight through
space-based X-ray and laser weaponry.43 The facilitation of this new
defense plan required an alternate interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
which was provided by Judge Abraham Sofaer, the legal advisor to the
State Department. "  In 1986, Sofaer concluded that a "broad"
interpretation of the ABM would allow for testing of "exotic"
technologies, such as space-based systems, which were not available
when the Treaty was negotiated in 1972.4' The administration
immediately adopted Sofaer's interpretation as policy in October 1985,
even though it differed from every other presidential administration's
policy since the Treaty's inception.4
Similar to the international policy debates currently surrounding the
ABM Treaty,47 President Reagan's strategy sparked opposition from
Congress, international commentators, the Soviets, and our NATO
allies.! The Soviets argued that Reagan's broad interpretation was
inconsistent with their reading of the Treaty. 9 The United States' allies
feared nuclear warfare between the two super powers and were
concerned about the potential ramifications of being excluded from the
42 See President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on National Security
(March 23, 1983) in 19 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 442, 447-48 (1983); see also Koplow,
supra note 6, at 1379.
43. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 854-55 (2001) (noting that SDI
was "the largest military research program since the Manhattan Project [and] would reach
an eventual cost of sixty billion dollars").
44. See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense
Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986); see generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Treaty
Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and
Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1986).
45. See Sofaer, supra note 44, at 1978 (presenting the non-classified version of his
conclusions that were also made available during congressional testimony).
46. See FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR
WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 290-91 (Simon & Schuster 2000); see also
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 25, at 1956 ("The new interpretation is directly contrary to
the position taken by the United States since 1972, when the Treaty was signed.").
47. See infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
4& See Koplow, supra note 6, at 1370-71 (explaining that "[m]ost of the senior
members of the United States SALT I negotiating delegation denounced the new
interpretation as a misreading of the ABM Treaty's text and negotiations, which they said
had produced a more comprehensive ban on ABM systems"); see also Monroe Leigh, Is
the President Above Customary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 759 (1.992)
("Many in the Senate, as well as preponderant scholarly opinion, took the position that the
President was offering an interpretation of the ABM Treaty wholly different from that
presented to the Senate when its 'advice and consent' was sought and received.").
49. See Koplow, supra note 6, at 1370-72.
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missile defense shield. ° Legal commentators argued that Reagan's
interpretation exceeded his executive powers and thereby violated
constitutional law.51 The Reagan administration's policy on the ABM
Treaty was exceedingly controversial, and "[i]n classrooms since, the
ABM Treaty reinterpretation controversy has been taught as an example
of executive constitutional over-reaching. ,,52
The ABM Treaty's significance to the stability of arms control and
reduction is evident given its considerable role in international politics
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.53 One commentator noted that
in both decades there was "a contest between conflicting interpretations
of the ABM Treaty, [which] served as proxies for deeper disagreements
concerning strategic nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War
world."' 4 During the early 1990s, the Bush I administration continued to
adhere to the ABM Treaty even in light of the radically changing
political circumstances.55 The Bush I administration continued with a
similar interpretation of the ABM Treaty as its predecessor, but it
slightly altered the SDI program to protect against a few dozen
warheads.56 Thus, the same conservative "broad" interpretation was
followed by the Bush I administration, though with a less radical
implementation than the SDI program under Reagan.57 As the 1990s
50. See id.
51. See generally Chayes & Chayes, supra note 25 (1986); Koplow, supra note 6.
52. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 860 (noting that Senator Biden's proposed "ABM
Treaty Interpretation Resolution," which meant to restrict the treaty's interpretation to
that which was construed by the Senate in 1972, was never approved by the full Senate).
Due to the controversy surrounding the ABM Treaty's interpretation, the so-called
"Biden condition" was attached to the subsequent INF Treaty, whereby the Senate
required that the Treaty be interpreted in the original manner of the Senate and President
during ratification. See id. Any further reinterpretation would require the consent of the
Senate. See id.
53. See id. at 902 (asserting that "[i]t is more than merely coincidental that the
primary treaty controversy of the 1990s should involve the very same treaty as that of the
1980s"). Additionally, the key element to the ABM Treaty, national missile defense, has
also played a divisive role in international politics. See Kellman, supra note 37, at 73
(stating that national missile defense "has been the most controversial weapons system
over the last 30 years").
54. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 902.
55. See id; see also Grogan, supra note 6, at 826 (explaining that in September 1991,
when the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, President George Bush initiated a
dialog with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to loosen some of the restrictions of the
ABM). In this Comment, the "Bush I administration" refers to the presidency of George
H. Bush; the "Bush administration" refers to the presidency of George W. Bush.
56. See President George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 90, 94 (Feb. 4, 1991).
57. Yoo, supra note 43, at 860.
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progressed, however, the new Democratic administration would cause
the pendulum to swing back toward the original interpretation.
The official position of the Clinton administration represented a
restrictive or traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty.58 In contrast
to the policies of the Bush I and Reagan administrations, Clinton's
restrictive interpretation meant that any National Missile Defense
program must strictly adhere to the guidelines established under the
ABM Treaty. 9 The Clinton administration's goal was to strengthen the
ABM Treaty and, in the process, strengthen relations with Russia.' ° As a
result, the Clinton administration shifted the focus of the SDI to a
Limited National Missile Defense system (LDS) that was focused on
protecting U.S. forces abroad from the threat of theater ballistic
missiles.' This interpretation guided the ABM Treaty policy and
modification decisions as they were needed in the late 1990S.
62
3. Modifications
In addition to offering various interpretations of the ABM Treaty,
each administration played a role in modifying the Treaty as required by
changes in global politics. This fact was particularly relevant during the
early 1990s as Cold War tensions began to ease with the disintegration of
the Soviet Union.3 The strategic theories of the ABM Treaty, like
MAD, were less viable absent a clear threat from a nuclear superpower.64
58. See Riveles, infra note 61.
59. See id.
60. See Baker Spring, Why the ABM Treaty Is Already Dead and What It Should
Mean for United States Security, 4 NEXUS 31, 31 (1999) (describing the Clinton
administration's goal for the future of the ABM as a three-step process: "1) preserve the
treaty by establishing state succession; 2) strengthen it by clarifying ambiguous treaty
language exempting defenses against shorter-range missiles from any restrictions; and 3)
broaden its scope by bringing certain types of defenses for countering shorter-range
missiles under treaty limits").
61. See Dr. Stanley Riveles, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Standing Consultative
Commission, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Address to the Seventh
Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense 2 (June 21, 1994) at
http://dosfan.lib.vic.edu/acda/speeches/riveles/riveltmd.htm (last modified Mar. 9, 2001).
62. See infra Part I.A.3.
63. See generally Collapse, supra note 22 (examining whether the ABM Treaty is still
binding on the United States following the fall of the Soviet Union and the legal impact of
modification of the treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate).
64. See id. The MAD theory was effective due to the underlying theory that "a single
government controlled the nuclear arsenal and could be held responsible for its use." Id.
1296 [Vol. 51:1287
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Instead of a single threat from one nation, there was an increase in
nuclear threats from various other nations.65
The Bush I administration was the first to confront this shift of
strategic control of global nuclear arms.66 The fall of the Soviet Union on
December 25, 1991 "dashed any hope of a clean, swift negotiated
solution on NMD."67  Bush chose to retain the Treaty, with some
modifications, as the foundation for arms control rather than exercise the
option to eliminate the ABM Treaty under its Extraordinary Events
Clause.68 Working within the paradigm of a broad interpretation of the
ABM Treaty, the Bush I administration initiated a cooperative program
with the U.S.S.R. whereby the two nations would work together on the
"Star Wars" program.69 On December 5, 1991, Congress passed the
Missile Defense Act of 199170 with the stated goal of preventing
"accidental or unauthorized launches or third world attacks" against the
United States.71 Congress explicitly stated that the act would not upset
the strategic balance that was secured by the provisions of the ABM
Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.72 In order to
further clarify that the goal of the act was not to "obtain relief from" the
ABM Treaty, Congress amended the Missile Defense Act in 1993."3 This
65. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 903. Fifteen independent states emerged from the
former U.S.S.R., four of which (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) possessed a
portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Id
66. See id.
67. See id. The fact that the United States was not simply negotiating with one
nuclear superpower "undermined the theory of mutually assured destruction between the
two superpowers, [and] also destabilized the bargain struck in the ABM Treaty that the
superpowers would limit themselves to a single ABM system each." Id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Missile Defense Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-190, §§ 231-240, 105 Stat. 1321-26
(repealed 1996). The United States' goal under the act was "to deploy an anti-ballistic
missile system, including one or an adequate additional number of anti-ballistic missile
sites and space-based sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the
United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles." Id.
71. Id. § 233(b)(2).
72. Id. § 236(a); see Yoo, supra note 43, at 903.
73. Compare Missile Defense Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1321-26 §
232 (repealed 1996), with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub.
L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315, 2356 § 234(a)(1992) (amending § 232(a) of the Missile
Defense Act of 1991). The original version of the Missile Defense Act states:
(a) Missile Defense Goal. It is a goal of the United States to - deploy an anti-
ballistic missile system, including one or an adequate additional number of anti-
ballistic missile sites and space-based sensors, that is capable of providing a
highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic
missiles; maintain strategic stability; and provide highly effective theater missile
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was done as an attempt to "soften" the language of the Missile Defense
Act of 1991 and demonstrate that the U.S. was planning to comply with
the ABM Treaty-at least overtly.74
Throughout the 1990s, a new threat of nuclear capable "rogue states"
emerged from the fading Cold War system.75 In an attempt to deal
effectively with the newly independent nations of the former Soviet
Union, the Clinton administration proposed a modification to the ABM
Treaty.76 In 1993, the administration announced a plan to multilateralize
the ABM Treaty to formally bind the new nations to the policies of the
ABM. 77  During this time period, Congress enacted the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 which further amended
the Missile Defense Act of 1991.71 Similar to the amendment in 1993, this
modification diminished the advancement of an NMD system.79  The
defenses (TMDs) to forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed
Forces of the United States and to friends and allies of the United States.
Missile Defense Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1321-26 § 232(a) (repealed
1996). The amendment strikes out:
"(a)" and all that follows through the end of paragraph (1) and insert[s] ... the
following: ...
(a) Missile Defense Goals of the United States. It is a goal of the United States
to - comply with the ABM Treaty, including any protocol or amendment thereto,
and not develop, test, or deploy any ballistic missile defense system, or
component thereof, in violation of the treaty, as modified by any protocol or
amendment thereto, while deploying an anti-ballistic missile system that is
capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat.
2315, 2356 § 234(a)(1.992) (amending § 232(a) of the Missile Defense Act of 199 1).
74. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 829-30 (explaining that "[a]lthough Congress paid lip
service to complying with the ABM Treaty, it still made it a goal of the U.S. to deploy an
ABM system capable of defending the territory of the U.S.").
75. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
76. See Riveles, supra note 61.
77. Id.
78. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
107 Stat. 1547 (1993).
79. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484,
106 Stat. 231.5 (1992). Section 234(a) amended § 232(1) of the Missile Defense Act of 1991
to state that the United States would
comply with the ABM Treaty, including any protocol or amendment thereto, and
not develop, test, or deploy any ballistic missile defense system, or component
thereof, in violation of the treaty, as modified by any protocol or amendment
thereto, while deploying an anti-ballistic missile system that is capable of
providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks
of ballistic missiles.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat.
2315 (1992).
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multi-nationalization of the ABM Treaty was formally introduced in
1997 when the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were negotiated
with the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.' The
MOUs were introduced as part of the Helsinki Summit between
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, in which the two leaders reaffirmed their
commitment to the Treaty.8' Under the MOU on Succession, the four
new republics would assume the same ABM Treaty rights and
obligations as the Soviet Union."' However, given the political tension
surrounding the issue, the agreement was never formalized because it
was never forwarded to the Senate for advice and consent.83
Issues concerning modifications and interpretation have enveloped the
ABM Treaty for the last three decades.84 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the current administration must cope with a similar dilemma. The
issue now is whether the United States can legally withdraw in light of
the global politics of the moment. An analysis of the legal implications
of withdrawal in both international and domestic law is required in order
to answer this question.8
B. When Can a Nation Legally Withdraw?
Because the ABM Treaty "represents an effort to employ legal
instruments to contain the arms race, ' it is necessary to follow the
established method of withdrawal from international agreements that has
been codified through hundreds of years of international custom and
codified law."' Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is first conditioned
80. Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,1972, Sept. 26, 1997, U.S.-Belr.-Kaz.-Russ.-Ukr. at
http://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/ad-mon.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
81. See Kellman, supra note 37, at 78.
82. See id.
83. See Spring, supra note 60, at 33 (hypothesizing that the reason President Clinton
did not send the MOU to the Senate for advice and consent was because of the possibility
that the agreement would lose and that it would attract critical attention to the validity of
the ABM Treaty).
84. See discussion supra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3
85. See Graham, supra note 29, at 57-58.
86. See id. at 58.
87. See Koplow, supra note 6, at 1.381 (explaining that the modem system of
international law "embraces and promotes certain important shared principles, and
consistently affects the way countries act and communicate in the international arena ...
[and also] provides a network of standards, as well as mechanisms for resolving disputes
regarding international treaty obligations"). See generally I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Manchester University Press 1973) (explaining
the significance of the codification on the law of treaties in the Vienna Convention).
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upon its article XV provision for withdrawal, the "Extraordinary Events
Clause." ' There is no bright-line test to determine whether an event is
either extraordinary or threatens national security. 9 Consequently, basic
concepts of international treaty interpretation must be examined to
effectively analyze the limitations of the Extraordinary Events Clause
under the ABM Treaty.9 Two concepts of customary international law
that are utilized by nations to guide their judgment in interpretation of
international agreements, pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus, are
fundamental to a discussion on treaty withdrawal.91 These withdrawal
concepts have been codified in the Vienna Convention on Treaties
through the "fundamental change in circumstances" and "good faith"
provisions.92
The Vienna Convention renders a more objective framework as
opposed to the subjective interpretation of international customary law.93
Nevertheless, the concepts on withdrawal still remain ambiguous, even in
codified form, because international law experts agree that the guidelines
set forth by the Vienna Convention are not black letter law, but only
general principles to follow in the interpretation of international
treaties.94  As a result, to effectively assess withdrawal under the
88. ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. XV; see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 666 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that "[a] treaty may be terminated or suspended in
accordance with a specific provision in that treaty, or otherwise at any time by consent of
all the parties after consultation").
89. See Cindy A. Cohn, Note, Interpreting the Withdrawal Clause in Arms Control
Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849, 855 (1989) (noting that "[o]nly limited interpretative
information regarding the Extraordinary Events Clause is available").
90. Id. (stating that the issue surrounding unilateral withdrawal is not new). A
significant source of guidelines for treaty interpretation on withdrawal is the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law, which states: "The termination or denunciation of an
international agreement, or the withdrawal of a party from an agreement, may take place
only (a) in conformity with the agreement or (b) by consent of all the parties."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 332 (1986).
91. See Cohn, supra note 89, at 855 (explaining that the customary doctrine rebus sic
stantibus is useful in defining when withdrawal is allowed under the extraordinary events
clause).
92. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 62, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339, 347.
93. See Cohn, supra note 89, at 857 (explaining that "[a]lthough neither the U.S. nor
the Soviet Union have ratified the Vienna Convention, both acknowledge its use as a
codification custom"); see also J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
108 (Dartmouth Publishing Company 1991) (explaining that the Vienna Convention
"codified and 'progressively developed' the customary rules on the law of treaties").
94. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 424 (2000); see also John K. Setear, An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
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Extraordinary Events Clause, interpretation of the context, object, and
purpose of the Treaty itself must be considered in addition to the various
concepts of international withdrawal.95
1. The Treaty Text: The Extraordinary Events Clause
Most treaties include provisions that allow nations to withdraw when it
is necessary to protect their sovereignty or supreme interests." Article
XV of the ABM Treaty includes such a withdrawal clause: "Each Party
shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests." '
This Extraordinary Events Clause is consistently used within various
bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements.98 Although this
clause is prevalent throughout arms control negotiations, it has never
been explicitly defined in international law.i9 Additionally, the clause has
been invoked as a justification for withdrawal in only one instance. °
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 147 (1996) ("An international treaty, like
other legal documents, is a textual specification of legal obligations.").
95. See O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 109 (stating that "it becomes necessary to
interpret the treaty 'in good faith', having regard to its context and in the light of its object
and purpose, and in this exercise, the essence of good faith comes to the fore"); see also
Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 31(1) (declaring that "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose").
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 332, cmt. a (1987)
(stating that "[miodern agreements generally specify either a term for the agreement [ or
procedures whereby a party may withdraw").
97. ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. XV(2) (declaring that "[s]uch notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests").
98. Cohn, supra note 89, at 851 (1989) (explaining that since this clause was first used
in the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, "this language has been included in all bilateral arms
agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and almost all multilateral arms
treaties").
99. Id. at 855 (noting that "[o]nly limited interpretative information regarding the
Extraordinary Events Clause is available") (footnote omitted).
100. See Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 749, 750 (1994) (detailing North Korea's notice of
withdrawal in March 1993 from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) under the Extraordinary Events Clause). In this instance, North Korea presented
two grounds for withdrawal: (1) a joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise which, as
North Korea claimed, renewed a nuclear threat by the U.S., and (2) a 1993 International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution, which demanded access
to inspect certain military sites. Id. at 762-64. However, this endeavor to utilize the
Extraordinary Events Clause was not fully realized because North Korea suspended its
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These examples demonstrate the absence of judicial interpretation or any
legal test to determine when withdrawal is deemed valid under the
Extraordinary Events Clause.'0 '
Legislative intent during the first use of this withdrawal clause in 1963
suggests that withdrawal would only be justified in the case of an extreme
interest of national security. "2 Thus, the "country could not withdraw for
simply frivolous or unrelated matters as a matter of whim and still
pretend that it is legal within the treaty to do so.''. 3 On the other hand,
the nature of the clause allows for self-judgment by the nation as to what
would be considered "extraordinary" or a "supreme national interest.""
Consequently, if the withdrawing state presents sufficient justification for
interpreting an event as "extraordinary," the nation's entitlement under
article XV to withdraw unilaterally "should be given the maximum
deference possible."'' ° Given the ambiguity in interpreting withdrawal
under the Extraordinary Events Clause, consideration must be given to
similar, related concepts within international law.' °6
a. Rebus Sic Stantibus and Fundamental Change of Circumstances
In deciphering valid, good faith withdrawal under the Extraordinary
Events Clause, it is useful to examine a parallel concept in international
law to clarify the ambiguities in the interpretation process.1°7 Rebus sic
stantibus is a concept of ancient customary law that literally means
"things standing thus.""" The concept is further defined in international
law as the "principle that all agreements are concluded with the implied
condition that they are binding only as long as there are no major
changes in circumstances.""' One of the significant aspects of this
withdrawal following intense negotiations with the United States in June of that year. See
id. at 751.
101. See Cohn, supra note 89, at 855-56.
102. See id. at 851.
103. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
88th Cong. 50 (1963) (statement of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State).
104. See Perez, supra note 100, at 776 (describing "[t]his kind of clause [as one which]
implies acceptance by the parties of self-interpretation as the applicable standard for
measuring performance of the rights and obligations subject to the clause").
105. Id. at 778.
106. See Cohn, supra note 89, at 855-56 (considering that although there is no clear
test for the extraordinary circumstances provision, the legal interpretations of rebus sic
stantibus are useful in giving some objective criteria to analyze withdrawal under this
clause).
107. See id.
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (7th ed. 1996).
109. Id.
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concept is its focus on profound changes that would frustrate both
nations' expectations of the treaty, thereby impeding the original
objectives of the agreement."'
Although the doctrine has been relied on since the 16th century,
interpretation in the past has been mostly subjective. "' Now the concept
is codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
as the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, which sets more objective
parameters as to when the doctrine may be invoked.1 2 The commission
specifically defined situations in which a change of circumstance would
permit withdrawal from a treaty, thereby setting a more objective basis
for the analysis of withdrawal. "' During the conference debates on
proposals for Article 62, it was determined that a state could not refer to
its own acts or omissions as a fundamental change in circumstances that
would invoke a withdrawal."' Additionally, the commission concluded
110. See Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing
Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 54, 76-77 (1988) (describing various
circumstances that may or may not be considered a fundamental change). In detailing the
significance of rebus sic stantibus in international agreements, the author explains that loss
of expected profit, profound economic hardship, or change of government or government
policy are all sufficient to warrant an exception under rebus sic stantibus. Id. at 76.
Furthermore, the author states that because "a change in the nationality of a territory is
insufficient to justify the application of [r]ebus [s]ic [s]tantibus, it is not surprising that a
change in the party in power, or even a revolutionary change in the form of a state's
government, is also considered insufficient by most commentators." Id. at 77.
111. Cohn, supra note 89, at 855-56.
112. See id. But see SINCLAIR, supra note 87, at 108 (stating that "the vagueness of the
language employed in formulating this series of articles presents a potential danger to the
stability of treaty relations").
113. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 62. The Convention states:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) If the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking
it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international
obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
Id.
114. See SINCLAIR, supra note 87, at 107.
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that any changes in government policy that were subjective in nature
could never be invoked as justification for treaty withdrawal." 5
This framework for treaty withdrawal, in light of national security
interests, has been regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental
doctrine pacta sunt servanda."'6 Because treaties cease to bind nations
when there is a fundamental change of circumstances, the requirement
that a nation adhere to the treaty in good faith becomes less significant.'
A resolution to this dilemma would require nations to explicitly abide by
the provisions of good faith when deciding whether to withdraw from a
treaty.
b. Pacta Sunt Servanda
When analyzing whether an event is "extraordinary" as defined by
international law, circumstances must be viewed with consideration of
the nation's good faith performance of the treaty."8 The rule of pacta
sunt servanda is a basic norm of international law and custom committing
nations to the fundamental ethical rule of being bound to one's
promises." 9 This theory of international law holds that agreements
undertaken must be kept.2"  This fundamental aspect of treaty
interpretation is reflected in the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as well as the
115. Id.
116. See generally David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic
Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-4 (1988)
(querying how "can the notion that fundamental changes in circumstances can terminate
treaties be reconciled with the promise of good faith made by countries when signing?").
But see Cohn, supra note 89, at 855 (stating that the evaluation of the fundamental change
in circumstances in light of the shared expectations and intentions of the parties is
"consistent with the goal of stability in treaty relationships and with the principle of pacta
sunt servanda").
117. See Bederman, supra note 116, at 2 (asserting that the tension between the
concepts of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibts has been an enduring issue in
international law).
118. See Vagts, supra note 39, at 323-24 (assessing the binding quality of treaties in
light of the "sanctity of treaty obligations" encompassed in the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda).
119. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th ed. 1999) (defining pacta sunt servanda
as "agreements [that] must be kept[:] [t]he rule that agreements and stipulations, esp.
those contained in treaties, must be observed"); Richard Hyland, Pacta Stnt Servanda: A
Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (1994) (expressing that pacta sunt servanda is not
only a legal norm, but also an ethical standard).
120. See Dickstein, supra note 110, at 71.-73 (noting the significance of pacta sunt
servanda, specifically in the process of internationalizing contracts).
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.21 The concept was codified
in the Vienna Convention as "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."' 2 Both the
Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor, the
International Court of Justice, have recognized the importance of the
rule of pacta sunt servanda in international law7z3
Pacta sunt servanda has been referred to as a concept that
encompasses principles of stability, balance, certainty, and trust.14 The
doctrine represents the center of international custom; nations must
observe treaties in good faith in order to keep stability within the global
structure.'2 The concept may be invoked to determine if any positive
rule of law, such as the right of withdrawal, has been applied honestly,
fairly, and reasonably.' 2 States are not only required to perform a treaty
in good faith, but treaty withdrawal must also follow the guidelines of this
concept. In sum, although withdrawal is a right given by the
Extraordinary Events Clause, this right must be practiced in good faith.
12
Thus, in analyzing whether there is a basis for withdrawal under the
121. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26. "The doctrine of pact sunta servanda .
•. lies at the core of the law of international agreements and is perhaps the most important
principle of international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321 cmt. a (1986).
122. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26.
123. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26) (ruling that the
United States could not avoid its treaty obligation, which required the Palestine
Liberation Organization to maintain an office in the United Nations in New York, by
enacting domestic legislation that contradicts the treaty); Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20) (stating that "[o]ne of the basic principles governing the
creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of
good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular
in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential").
124. Bederman, supra note 116, at 2.
125. Id. Various rules of modern international law codified in the Vienna Convention
of Treaties are derived from the concept of "good faith," including: pacta sunt servanda
(Article 26); refraining from acts frustrating the object of the treaty (Article 18); avoiding
fraud, corruption, and coercion (Articles 49, 50, 51); and the fundamental change in
circumstances, rebus sic stantibus (Article 62). Vienna Convention, supra note 92 at art.
18, 26,49, 50, 51, 62; see also O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 110.
126. See O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 110 (explaining that when interpreting a treaty,
the court should take note of what the parties fairly and reasonably intended when
negotiating the treaty by observing subsequent conduct and practice of those parties).
127. See id. at 110-11.
12& See id. at 111 (stating that rights under a treaty are often practiced in bad faith, as
when one party to an agreement repudiates due to a less than material breach by the other
party).
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Extraordinary Events Clause, one must view the party's good-faith need
to be released against the purposes of the treaty.'
21
Alternatively, as a general rule, states can require other signatories of
the treaty to retain a good faith commitment to the treaty terms13°
However, this requirement to remain committed to an agreement
becomes complicated when there is a need to withdraw due to a change
in circumstances or a threat to the sovereignty of a nation.13' As such, the
right to demand compliance with a treaty must also be exercised in good
faith where compliance may be unreasonable in light of changing
circumstances.'3 2
2. Domestic Laws
The interplay between domestic law and international law is a
significant factor in assessing when the United States may legally
withdraw from a bilateral treaty.'33 Analyzing the domestic laws of the
United States aids in the determination of whether the President is
prohibited from violating international law. 4 For example, it is possible
to legally invalidate an international agreement under domestic law even
when the international protocol for withdrawal has not been met. 13 In
such circumstances, the President would be free from legal accountability
129. See id. (explaining that where the words are ambiguous, it is often necessary to
look beyond the plain meaning of the text, to the object and purpose of the treaty or the
"spirit" of the treaty).
130. Seeid.atl10.
131. See id. (indicating that the good faith requirement becomes complicated "in the
nature, scope and function of the principle of good faith in the law of treaties").
132 See id. at 112. The International Court of Justice explains that it may be unfair to
require adherence to a treaty where there is "a radical transformation of the extent of the
obligations still to be performed. The change must have increased the burden of the
obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the performance something
essentially different from that originally undertaken." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. &
N. Jr. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 21.
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 339, note 1 (1987) ("The President's authority to terminate or suspend
international agreements is implied in his office as it has developed over almost two
centuries.").
134. See generally Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary International
Law? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757 (confronting the issue of "whether the President has the
authority under domestic law to commit or order a violation of customary international
law").
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, cmt. b (1987) (explaining that "although a subsequent act of Congress may
supersede a rule of international law or an international agreement as domestic law, the
United States remains bound by the rule or agreement internationally").
1306
2002] The United States' Withdrawal From the ABM Treaty
under the United States judicial system and would only be responsibleinternationally. 136
a. Constitutional Law and Judicial Deference
Because the United States Constitution confers the power to make
international decisions upon both the executive and legislative branches,
the judiciary often defers to the decisions of those branches. 37 Even
though it is not explicitly detailed in the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has consistently interpreted the Constitution as delegating broad foreign
relations powers to the President, which has led to judicial deference in
the area of international affairs. 18  Due to the broad deference given to
the executive branch, actions taken by the President often go
unquestioned, even if there is a violation of international customary
law.
139
In declaring that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction," the Supreme Court, in The Paquete Habana, made clear the
significant relation between domestic and international law. 4' Although
136. See id.
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (declaring that the President may make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(concluding that an unconstitutional congressional delegation can be sustained on the
ground that it involved foreign affairs). The Court described the President's authority as:
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations .... Negotiation
and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.
Id. at 320; see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (stating that "the conduct
of foreign relations was committed by the U.S. Constitution to the political departments of
the government, and the propriety of what could be done in the exercise of this political
power was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942) (holding that the President could enforce a foreign decree confiscating bank
deposits and other property held in New York, even though it violated New York law); Ex
parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (stating "that our national interest will be better served in
such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a friendly foreign power,
are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial
proceedings"); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (declaring that courts are bound by
executive determinations on sovereign immunity).
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, rptr. note 3 (1987) (stating that "the [fact that] courts will not compel the
President to honor international law may be implied in Supreme Court statements...").
140. The Paquete Habana, 175 US. 677, 700, 706 (1900) (concluding that it is an
established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels are exempt from capture as
prizes of war). The Paquete Habana is the leading case concerning the incorporation of
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The Paquete Habana recognized the incorporation of international law
into United States domestic law, there has been no additional
clarification by the Supreme Court in this area. 4' Thus, ambiguity arises
because the President is constitutionally bound to "take [c]are that the
[l]aws be faithfully executed' 412 even though he may disregard a rule of
international law. 43 Various commentators have developed arguments
for and against requiring the President to follow international law, each
relying on similar legal sources, such as the United States Constitution.'4
This is a seeming contradiction if, in fact, international law is part of the
domestic law of the United States. 145
One argument supporting Presidential compliance with international
law is that all executive branch officials are bound to follow international
law because it is part of federal common law.'46 Consequently, if there is
a breach of international customary law, the President could be held
accountable by both the global community and the United States.
47
Others argue that the President has the constitutional authority to
unilaterally terminate a treaty. 4' Even in the silence of the constitutional
international law into United States domestic law. See Michael J. Glennon, Raising The
Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321, 322 (1985).
141. See Glennon, supra note 140.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3.
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, rptr. note 3 (1987) ("There is authority for the view that the President has
the power, when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard a rule of
international law or an agreement of the United States, notwithstanding that international
law and agreements are law of the United States....").
144. See Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 377, 382 (1987) (declaring that "by 1900 ... relevant trends in legal decision from
the time of the Framers to the 20th century clearly supported the expectation that the
President is bound by supreme federal law whether that law is customary or treaty-
based"); Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 923,
924 (1986) (stating that "the President has no plenary power to act in violation of
international law"). But cf Yoo, supra note 43, at 854 (concluding that "President George
W. Bush may enjoy firm constitutional authority to declare either that the ABM Treaty is
terminated or that it does not prohibit a limited NMD program").
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, rptr. note 3 (1987).
146. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause declares the Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties to be "the supreme Law of the Land." Id. The courts
have also inferred that treaties are authoritatively equal to United States statutes. See,
e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888);
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also Glennon, supra note 144, at 924.
147. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1561 (1984).
148. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 873-74.
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t .149text, 4 interpretations by commentators, courts, and government entities
support this contention."5  In matters involving foreign affairs, this
question should ultimately be for the executive and legislative branches,
not the courts, to decide. 5'
b. Senate and Executive Understandings
Under Article VI of the United States Constitution, international
treaty law is part of the supreme law of the land, therefore, the President
is bound by these laws."'2 Although the President does not need the
consent of the Senate to terminate a treaty,"' the specific power to
terminate a treaty is not an exclusive power of the President."' The
President is able to terminate the treaty on his own only "in accordance
with its terms" and only if Congress does not expressly prohibit its
149. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §339, cmt. a (1987) ("The Constitution does not expressly confer on the President
authority to terminate or suspend an international agreement on behalf of the United
States. The rules stated in this section are based on the constitutional authority of the
President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.").
150. See Yoo, supra note 43, at 873-74 ("The President retains this authority due to his
leadership in foreign affairs and his structural superiority in conducting international
relations.") (parenthetical and footnote omitted).
151. See Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-
Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L 736, 743 (1992) (explaining that "under the U.S. Constitution,
it is for the President and Congress to decide whether to breach U.S. obligations under
international law").
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, cmt. a (1987) (stating that "[a]n act of Congress and a self-executing treaty
of the United States are of equal status in United States law..
153. Id. § 339 (1987).
Under the law of the United States, the President has the power:
to suspend or terminate an agreement in accordance with its terms;
to make the determination that would justify the United States in
terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by another
party or because of supervening events, and to proceed to terminate or
suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States; or
to elect in a particular case not to suspend or terminate an agreement.
Id.
154. Id. § 339, cmt. a (1987).
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termination. 5   Thus, the President gains more power if he receives
assistance from the Senate.
56
Generally, the President is required to follow customary international
law in times of congressional silence. Conversely, with congressional
authorization -and perhaps without - he is able to disregard any norm of
customary international law.157 However, Congress has the right under
the United States Constitution to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations. 58 This has been interpreted to mean that Congress has
the power to prohibit any or all offenses against international law.'59
Nevertheless, the Senate may not formally end a treaty without the
participation of the President or the full Congress.IW
The President's authority to terminate a treaty under domestic law
presents obvious ambiguities as to how that would affect the United
States' obligations under international law. 16' The law of the United
States implies that the President could legally terminate a treaty under
155. Id. To clarify this contention, the official comments to the Restatement declare:
[I]f the United States Senate, in giving consent to a treaty, declares that it does so
on condition that the President shall not terminate the treaty without the consent
of Congress or of the Senate, or that he shall do so only in accordance with some
other procedure, that condition presumably would be binding on the President if
he proceeded to make the treaty.
Id.
156. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (explaining, in his famous concurrence, the varying degrees of the
President's power in relation to consent of Congress). Justice Jackson stated:
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction
or conjunction with those of Congress... When the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it
may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty ... When the President acts
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility ... When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
157. Glennon, supra note 144, at 923.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
159. Glennon, supra note 144, at 923-24.
160. Yoo, supra note 43, at 874.
161. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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domestic law even if this termination would result in a breach of
international law. 62 Ultimately, the question revolves around issues of
accountability and disputability of the President's authority.' 63 With no
liability under the United States judicial system, the Executive need only
answer to the legal objections of the international community, and this
liability is predicated upon compliance with the treaty terms for
withdrawal and related international law.'6
II. IS THERE AN "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE?"
A. The Executive Branch's Argument for Withdrawal
Experts within the Bush administration emphasize that withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty is necessary to continue the testing and formation
of the NMD plan.' 6 If the development process continues at its present
pace, the NMD program will conflict with the provisions of the ABM
Treaty by the end of 2001.'66 President George W. Bush is scheduled to
meet with Russian President Vladmir Putin in November at Bush's Texas
ranch to discuss bilateral withdrawal from the Treaty or the possibility of
reworking the Treaty to allow for testing of a NID. 16' Regardless of thedecisions or concessions made by Russia, President Bush has made it
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115, cmt. a (1987).
163. Id. at § 339, note 2 (1987) (detailing the constitutional power to terminate a treaty
or a Congressional-Executive agreement). This issue was first litigated in 1979 when
members of Congress challenged President Carter's authority to terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China (Taiwan). Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Of the eight judges, four reached the substantive issue,
declaring that the President had the authority to terminate the treaty and did not need the
concurrence of Congress or the Senate alone. Id. The Supreme Court then vacated and
remanded the decision, giving instructions to dismiss the complaint. Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979). The one Justice that did reach the substantive issue, Justice Brennan,
concluded that the power of the President to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty was "a
necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government .... Our cases
firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes." Id. at 1007.
164. See discussion, supra Part I.B.1.
165. See Loeb, supra note 11.
166. Id. For a discussion of events subsequent to the writing of this Comment, see
notes 223-232 and accompanying addendum.
167. LaFraniere, supra note 3.
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clear that the United States will function on its own timetable for
withdrawal.' 6'
1. Collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the End of the Cold War
The withdrawal policy has become a fiery issue with various legal
implications because the Bush administration's justifications for
withdrawal are political in nature. 69 The most often cited rationale for
unilateral U.S. withdrawal has been that the end of the Cold War
initiated major changes in the global political configuration.170 President
Bush expressed this view at a press conference marking the one month
anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks.' When asked
whether the plan to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was still viable,
President Bush responded that "the Cold War is over, it's done with and
there are new threats we face."' 72 The President's remarks embodied the
general sentiment among missile defense proponents who insist that
without two obvious nuclear superpowers, nuclear deterrence through a
concept such as MAD is no longer viable.73 Generally, Republican
politicians and conservatives have asserted that the treaty is no longer
168. Bush: U.S. To Have Own Timetable For ABM Pullout, available at
http://www.cnn. com/2001/ALLPOLIITCS/08/23/bush.defense/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 12,2001).
169. See John Issacs, Talking Points on the Case Against the ABM Treaty, 4 NEXUS
93, 94 (1999) ("National Missile Defense proponents are using the cover of legal
arguments to make what is essentially a political case for deployment.").
170. Nuclear Cuts, supra note 10. In a speech given on May 1, 2001, President Bush
summarized his position, to which he has held fast even to the present date:
Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is
the Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. Its
government is no longer Communist. Its president is elected. Today's Russia is
not our enemy, but a country in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a
great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors .... To maintain
peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek
security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who
seek to destroy us.... We need a new framework that allows us to build missile
defenses to counter the different threats of today's world.
Id.
171. See Anne E. Kornblut and Michael Kranish, Fighting Terror/The President
Speaks, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12,2001, at Al.
172. Id.
173. See generally Ariel Cohen & Baker Spring, Strategic Defense and Cooperation
Must Top the Agenda at the Bush-Putin Summit in Texas, November 7, 2001, available at
http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bgl501.html (outlining the need to redefine
nuclear cooperation by first eliminating the ABM Treaty and then forming a cooperative
framework with Russia for a system of missile defense).
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valid because of the collapse of the Soviet Union."4 However, since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, there have been varying
opinions as to whether the ABM Treaty is still in effect."7 5
2. "Rogue States" and a New Terrorist Threat
The structure of the nuclear powers in the world is no longer as clear-
cut as during the days of the Cold War.76 Rather than a nuclear standoff
between two powerful nations, the threat of nuclear warfare is scattered
throughout the globe in nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and North
Korea.'m These nations have developed their nuclear capabilities in the
three decades following the signing of the ABM Treaty.7 1 Concerns
about random attacks from these nations, known as "rogue states," has
further enhanced the appeal of a NMD.
17
The threat of terrorists, which came to the forefront of international
politics following the events of September 1 1 th, has produced an even
more viable argument for the Bush administration.' As John Bolton,
174. Issacs, supra note 169, at 93. The Miron-Feith analysis, which concluded that the
ABM Treaty did not survive the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was described by then
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms as "the most convincing and
exhaustive legal analysis done on the subject to date." Id. at 94.
175. See, e.g., Spring, supra note 60, at 31 (asserting that the result of the collapse of
the Soviet Union is that the ABM is no longer binding on the United States, for there is
not one state or group of states able to fulfill the U.S.S.R.'s obligations under the treaty.).
But cf Kellman, supra note 37, at 78-79 (proclaiming that "[it should be absolutely
beyond serious question that the United States is currently bound by the ABM Treaty").
176. See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 99, 103-05 (submitting that the dangers of the
ABM doctrine are now "amplified by the emergence of China as a nuclear superpower
and the proliferation of nuclear missile technology to nations like North Korea, Iran,
India, Pakistan, and Iraq").
177. Id. at 99. See Nuclear Cuts, supra note 10. President Bush highlights this fact
when describing the present state of affairs:
More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations ....
Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow
them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible
speeds .... Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from
thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of
missiles in the hands of these [rogue] states, states for whom terror and blackmail
are a way of life.
Id.
178. See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 99.
179. See id.
180. See Baker Spring, Talking Points: Terrorist Attack on America Confirms the
Growing Need for Missile Defense, September 20, 2001, at http://www.heritage.org/
library/backgrounder/bg1477.htmi (asserting that the "horrific events [of September 11th
have] proven beyond any doubt that terrorists will use any means, at any costs, to
devastate America").
1313
Catholic University Law Review
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
clearly stated, "[t]hese horrible events demonstrated ... that there were
people in the world who didn't adhere to classic notions of deterrence
and whose value systems and respect for human life didn't quite match
Western standards.""'' The fear is not only that rogue states may use
their nuclear capabilities, but also that these missiles could be sold to the
highest bidding terrorists.82
B. Counter-Argument: Finding the Holes
1. End of the Cold War
The Bush administration's justifications for withdrawal may be
politically valid but are questionable in light of legal analysis.8 3 A
nation's entitlement to unilaterally withdraw under Article XV of the
ABM Treaty allows a certain amount of deference to be given to the
withdrawing state."' Nevertheless, treaty withdrawal must be
undertaken in accordance with the standard of good faith set out by
international law." As such, the Bush administration's justification for
withdrawal should not consist of excuses put forth to rid itself of
inconvenient treaty restrictions, but rather should be based on valid
indications of threats to the national security of the United States. 86
To interpret whether the Bush administration's reasons for withdrawal
are valid under the Extraordinary Events Clause, the context of the
Treaty in light of its object and purpose must be taken into
consideration. 87 As noted above, the Treaty was negotiated and signed
181. Colin McMahon, Terrorism Spurs Missile Shield Debate, CHI. TRIB, Sept 23,2001,
at 18.
182. See Spring, supra note 180 (noting that "[w]ith the proliferation of ballistic
missiles to rogue states like North Korea, the likelihood that terrorists and despots will use
these weapons of mass destruction to attack U.S. territory has grown substantially").
Rogue nations, as well as terrorist groups, have the "capacity both to obtain and launch
such missiles." Id.
183. See Issacs, supra note 169, at 94 ("National Missile Defense proponents are using
the cover of legal arguments to make what is essentially a political case for deployment.").
184. Perez, supra note 100, at 778.
185. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26.
186. See O'CONNOR, supra note 93, at 110 (explaining that states right of withdrawal
has "too often been used as an excuse for withdrawing from a treaty that a particular state
has found inconvenient").
187. See Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 31(1) (stating "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose").
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during the Cold War in hopes of reducing nuclear arms. The ABM
Treaty was signed with a companion document, together forming the
SALT I accords. 89 The Russians, and various international analysts,
contend that the SALT limitations, and later the START reductions,
were interlinked with the ABM Treaty framework. 9"° Indeed, the
Russians would not ratify the START II accords unless the United States
guaranteed adherence to the ABM Treaty.'9' Accordingly, as part of the
object and purpose of the Treaty, a discussion of extraordinary
circumstances and withdrawal should include the START accords.
During the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, both the
Bush I and the Clinton administrations were working toward reinstating
and modifying all of their treaties with Russia.'9 The United States
stated its desire to maintain the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of arms
control reduction. 93 Even the Bush I administration accepted Russia as
188. Grogan, supra note 6, at 803-04.
189. See Graham, Jr., supra note 29, at 58. ("By limiting the amount of defenses either
side could deploy, the ABM Treaty made the SALT limitations and START reductions of
the superpower nuclear arsenals possible.").
190. See Peter W. Mason, Arms Control and Disarmament, 34 INT'L LAW. 609, 616
(2000) (noting the significance of the START II protocol to the discussions of the ABM).
Although the Russian Duma approved the START II Treaty in April 2000, its approval
was contingent on a provision indicating that Russia would withdraw from START II if
the United States began to build a strategic missile defense. Id. See also Grogan, supra
note 6, at 801 (explaining that the Russians were hesitant to cut back their nuclear arsenal
under START II during the same time that the U.S. was fortifying with national missile
defense capabilities).
191. See Mason, supra note 190, at 611-12 (stating that in 1999, the Russians postponed
the ratification of START I1 in response the United States' plan to build a national missile
defense). Indeed, on the day he signed the agreement, Russian President Putin stated, "If
... the United States Destroys [sic] the ABM Treaty... [we] will withdraw not only from
START II but also from the entire system of treaty relations on the limitation and control
of stragetic and conventional armaments." Id. at 616.
192. See Issacs, supra note 169, at 95 (stating that Russia assumed the treaty
obligations of the Soviet Union shortly after its dissolution). Specifically, Russian
President Yeltsin said:
Russia regards itself as the legal successor to the USSR in the field of
responsibility for fulfilling international obligations. We confirm all obligations
under bilateral and multilateral agreements in the field of arms limitations and
disarmament which were signed by the Soviet Union and are in effect at present.
Id.
193. See Grogan, supra note 6, at 838. In May of 1995, President Clinton and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin gave a joint statement on the ABM following a summit in
Helsinki, Finland which declared basic principles on the issue of national defense. See id.
Although these principles were vague, both sides agreed that the ABM would remain "a
cornerstone of strategic stability." Id.
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the Soviet Union's successor state to the ABM Treaty."9' There were
proposals for mulitlateralizing the ABM Treaty (MOU) to include some
of the newly established states of the former Soviet Union."5 If the end
of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet bloc were to alter the ABM
Treaty, then the logical timeframe for this to occur would have been
during the START negotiations between Russia and the United States
and within the framework of the new START formulation. 9'
It is now too late for a new administration, at the start of the twenty-
first century, to point to an event of the early 1990s as justification for
unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.197 This event may have
been considered "extraordinary" or a threat to the supreme national
interests of the United States during the early 1990s, thereby justifying
withdrawal during that time, but not today."98 The fall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War would not be a good faith
justification for withdrawal under the Extraordinary Events Clause of the
ABM Treaty. 99 However, a valid argument for withdrawal may include
the ramifications of the changes that occurred in the global political
194. See Issacs, supra note 169, at 95. In 1992, former U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker spoke for both the first Bush Administration and the United States when he stated:
I made the point to President Yeltsin that the United States remains committed
to the ABM Treaty... [T]he fact of the matter is, we've made the point that we
expect the states of the Commonwealth [including Russia] to abide by all the
international treaties and obligations that were entered into by the former Soviet
Union, including the ABM Treaty.
Id.
195. See Kellman, supra note 37, at 78.
196. See Mason, supra note 190, at 613. Indeed, the reality was the exact opposite; the
two nations reaffirmed their commitment during the START II negotiations in a Joint
Statement Concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further
Strengthening Stability. See id. In relation to the ABM Treaty, the statement provided:
Proceeding from the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for further
reductions in strategic offensive arms, and from the need to maintain the
strategic balance between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty, which is a
cornerstone of strategic stability, and to continuing efforts to strengthen the
Treaty, to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future.
Id. at 613 (citing to the Joint Statement Between the United States and the Russian
Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further
Strengthening of Stability (June 20, 1999), available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/
uri-res/12R?urn:pdi//oma.eop.gov.us1999/6/201 1.text.1.).
197. See Collapse, supra note 22 (stating that the United States has attempted to
resolve the issue of Soviet succession and determine whether the rights and obligations of
the Soviet Union could be assumed by the various nations of the former Soviet Union).
19& See ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art.XV.
199. See discussion and notes supra Part I.B.
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structure following the Cold War, in which nuclear threats from rogue
states and terrorists have been introduced. 20°
2. "Rogue States" and Terrorists Threats
With the end of the Cold War, the global political reality has been
altered.20' No longer are there two superpowers whose political
dilemmas represent possible nuclear fallout for all nations.202 Today the
threat comes from various "rogue states" and possible terrorist attacks.0 3
The issue now is whether these new threats, not the decade-old concern
of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, constitute an extraordinary event" to
justify the United States' unilateral withdrawal.
In light of the political scene, recently catalyzed by the events of
September 11th, the Bush administration could frame a valid, good faith
argument for withdrawal based on national security interests. 
2
W
Considering the "self-interpretation" characteristic of the Extraordinary
Events Clause, review of these justifications must be similar to that of an
appellate review.205 Deference must be given to this need for withdrawal
because, on its face, the terrorist threat seems to present a good faith
basis. There are arguments, however, that maintaining the ABM Treaty
would fortify international unity, which is needed even more so during
this time.'
200. See discussion and notes supra Part II.
201. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 296.
202. See id. (explaining that the global climate has changed considerably since the
United States and the Soviet Union were among the only countries in the world with
nuclear capability).
203. See Graham, Jr., supra note 29, at 57-58 (detailing the precarious situation of the
nuclear tests in Pakistan and India and the missile threat from "rogue states" such as Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea that "underscore the perilous condition of the Treaty regime").
204. Ariel Cohn & Baker Spring, Strategic Defense and Cooperation Must Top the
Agenda at the Bush-Putin Summit in Texas, November 7, 2001, available at
http://www.heritage.org/
library/backgrounder/bgl50l.html. ("The attacks of September 11 made it painfully clear
to world leaders that innocent Americans are being targeted by terrorists who will use any
means to inflict the greatest toll.").
205. See Perez, supra note 100, at 776-77.
206. See Daalder & Lindsay, supra note 22.
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IV. MORE EFFECTIVE, LEGALLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVES
There is much opposition to the Bush administration's policy of
unilateral withdrawal without compromise. Opponents include
international law experts, the United States' allies, and of course,
Russia."8 Even though the Bush administration may be able to avoid
legal accountability for unilateral withdrawal, the strategic and political
consequences could be substantial.3 9 In order to appease Russia and
other opponents of the NNMD plan, Bush should consider other viable
alternatives that would more closely adhere to the legal structure under
the ABM Treaty.2"'
A. Greater Flexibility
At present, the Bush administration has made noteworthy efforts to
negotiate arms reduction with the Russians; however, the administration
will not relinquish its pursuit of a missile defense plan and renunciation
of the ABM Treaty."' Although the Bush administration would prefer
207. See id. (stating that "unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be widely
seen as definitive proof that the United States has become a rogue superpower that
considers itself above the law").
208. See id. Although Russia has demonstrated that it may be interested in modifying
the ABM, it has shown minimal interest in bilateral withdrawal and insists that the treaty
remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. Id.
209. See Daalder & Lindsay, supra note 22 (highlighting that unilateral withdrawal
"would severely damage American interests abroad [and] also jeopardize efforts to
maintain domestic political support for missile defense"); see also Kellman, supra note 37,
at 79 (stating that the United States can withdraw from its commitment, though the
international community will take this action to mean the United States' commitments are
of limited value). One commentator clearly expressed this idea:
If the most powerful nation on earth unilaterally reinterprets treaty obligations
to its own advantage, other nations can only be expected to follow suit. The U.S.
needs to set a clear and unequivocal example-honour your treaty commitments.
In the long run, the U.S. can only stand to gain through its principled
commitment to integrity and the rule of law in international relations.
Id. (quoting David E. Grogan, Power Play: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, National
Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 838 (1999)).
210. See generally Burrus M. Carnahan & Katherine L. Starr, supra note 38, at 615
(underscoring the need for treaty modification due to disputes over legal interpretations,
technological advances, or changes in national security in order to keep the treaty relevant
and viable).
211. See Karen DeYoung & Dana Milbank, Bush, Putin Agree To Slash Nuclear Arms,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al. The three-day summit between President Bush and
Russian President Vladmir Putin was what both president's referred to in their joint
statement as "a new relationship . . . founded on a commitment to the values of
democracy, the free market and the rule of law. The United States and Russia have
overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or
threat." Id. The countries both pledged to reduce their arsenals of nuclear warheads by
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bilateral withdrawal, 212 it insists that the United States will unilaterally
withdraw without Russian support and according to their own
timeframe.213 Instead, the United States should take a more diplomatic
approach with Russia. The best way to accomplish the administration's
goals is through negotiation and cooperation.214 Russia has recently
offered to amend the Treaty to avoid a complete withdrawal by the
United States.215 By negotiating reasonable and necessary changes to the
ABM Treaty, President Bush could accomplish his long-term goal
without disturbing the amicable relations between the United States and
Russia.2 6
B. Compromise: Limited Missile Defense Agreement With Russia
The Bush administration's goal of increased national security with the
NMJD could be effectively accomplished through a joint allied limited
defense plan.21'7 This alternative plan may "preserve good relations and
security cooperation among the great powers while dealing with the
rogue-state threat. 2 18 Bush could negotiate an amendment with Russia
to allow for a limited NMD plan, whereby nations could have two
more than two-thirds over the next decade, which would be the lowest level since the
1960s. Id. Specifically, the United States would be dropping their numbers from the
current total of 7,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200. Id. As for the question of the ABM
Treaty and the actual deployment of the missile defense system, it will have to wait for
another day. Id. Once again, the United States has made clear "its determination [to]
move forward on missile defense, beyond the confines of the ABM Treaty, whether
Moscow agrees or not." Id.
212. See Daalder & Lindsay, supra note 22 (explaining that "a unilateral withdrawal
would be a foreign policy disaster ... [and] would trigger a divisive political debate at
home.").
213. Timetable for ABM Pullout, supra note 168.
214. See Rhinelander, supra note 21.
215. Colin McMahon, Terrorism Spurs Missile Shield Debate, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 23,
2001, at 18. Amending arms-reduction treaties is often a difficult task because of the
"complexity of the negotiation process and security concerns," and there are alternative
options available. See Carnahan & Starr, supra note 210, at 616, 632-33. Alternatives
include:
(1) a side agreement or memorandum of understanding which, unlike a protocol,
would have no direct reference to the treaty per se; (2) a politically-binding
agreement, which implies that it is binding in the current political context but
lacks the weight of a legally-binding agreement . . .; and (3) identical letters of
intent, which would be sent to depositaries as an expression of parallel policies.
Id. at 630-32. Additional alternatives would be to create a protocol or come to a consensus
on the interpretation of the treaty provisions. Id. at 632.
216. See Rhinelander, supra note 21.
217. See O'Hanlon, supra note 1.
218. Id.
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deployment sites. 219 The fundamental ban on strategically significant
defenses must remain in place; however, each side should be allowed to
deploy defenses to provide protection from "rogue states."2 0 This plan
could make available a smaller scale defense still accepted within the
structure of the ABM Treaty, which would reduce the threat of rogue
states.2" Additionally, this limited defense structure could encompass
not only the Russians, but also European and Asian allies interested in
defending against rogue states.22
V. CONCLUSION
International law and custom, which have been integrated into the
United States' domestic law, define when a nation may unilaterally
withdraw from a treaty. Although Bush's plan for unilateral withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty nearly breaches these laws, the fact remains that
the United States will likely not be held legally accountable. This reality
is particularly true after the September 11th terrorist attack on the
United States. Nevertheless, the international political implications to
unilateral withdrawal will have significant effects on the United States'
strategic nuclear position and on global arms reduction. Thus,
alternative resolutions, such as compromise with Russia and greater
flexibility in negotiations, would prove more effective both in terms of
international law and global policy decisions for the United States.
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the completion of this Comment, the Bush
administration announced, on December 13, 2001, the United States'
formal six-month notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.22  In
219. See id. But see David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment Not an Amendment?:
Modification of Arms Control Agreements Without the Senate, 59 U.CHI.L.REV. 981, 984
(1992) (presenting the thesis that the "executive branch efforts to wrest additional treaty-
related powers from the Congress-whether undertaken in the blatant manner of the
reinterpretation escapade or in the seemingly more benign, indirect style of the current
non-amendment question - are dangerous and unwarranted").
220. See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, Putting Nuclear Weapons Out of Reach,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at 15. The authors note that an agreement "that allows
the deployment of boost-phase defense capable of shooting down enemy missiles shortly
after launch but that also strictly limits the number of mid-course interceptors and bans all
space-based weaponry would strike the right balance." Id.
221. See id.
222. Jim Garamone, DOD Seeks To Expand New Relationship with Russia, available
at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001lno8312001 200108312.html.
223. See From Bush, 'Formal Notice' of End of Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at
A14.
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stating the official justification for withdrawal, President Bush declared
that "the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways
to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile
attacks." ' Bush also indicated that other factors, which were discussed
previously in this Comment, were also significant in the decision to
withdraw.225 These factors included the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the increasingly friendly relations between the United States and
Russia, which presumably preclude the need for a system such as
mutually asserted destruction.2 The official justification for withdrawal
seemed to be an exercise of the United States' rights under the
Extraordinary Events Clause; however, other political factors were
clearly integral to the decision.2
Rather than rendering the withdrawal issue moot, this action by
President Bush instigated continued controversy. The Bush
administration insists that withdrawal will have no negative effects on
United States-Russian relations.22 Conversely, many critics believe that
the withdrawal was not only made contrary to international law, 2 9 but
also that United States-Russian relations will suffer as a result of this
decision.230 It is unclear what effect this withdrawal will have on long-
term relations with Russia or on global nuclear relations.' Nevertheless,





228. See Scott Applewhite, Bush Rips Up "Obsolete" Missile Treaty: Is This Another
Case of America Riding Roughshod Over the World?, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 14, 2001,
at 3. The authors also note that "it is unclear whether Russia will be quite as unconcerned
by the abandonment of the ABM pact as Mr. Bush expects." Id. Russian President
Putin's response to the withdrawal was ambiguous, for he stated that the decision was "a
mistake," but that it would not harm Russia's national security. Id. See also US. Notifies
Russia of Exit From 30-Year ABM Treaty, WASH. POST, December 16, 2001, at A3
(highlighting the Bush administration's satisfaction over the Russian response to the
withdrawal). "Bush administration officials hailed the relatively mild Russian response as
evidence that even though months of negotiations had failed to produce an agreement
over missile defense tests and the 1972 Treaty, the talks had eased Russian anxieties over
the effects of such missile defense systems." Id.
229. See Robert S. McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., Bush ABM Stance Endangers
America, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2002, at Ell (stating that "the administration has
announced U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty despite expert
testimony that there is no technological requirement to do so at this time").
230. See id. Although President Putin's initial response to the United States'
withdrawal has "wisely been muted," there remains the possibility of increased tensions,
negative responses, and issues regarding ratification for future arms reduction treaties. Id.
231. See generally Applewhite, supra note 228.
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international law, the consequences of this act ultimately will be political
in nature, not legal. 2 2
232. See McNamara & Graham, Jr., supra note 229. Withdrawal from the treaty will
have negative global and political consequences, for "[t]his unfortunate step will likely
spark an arms race in Asia, with China carrying through on its threat to more rapidly
expand and modernize its strategic nuclear forces, perhaps to be followed by India and
Pakistan." Id.
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